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THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR MENTALLY
ILL JUVENILES IN CALIFORNIA
In July of 1969, a 13-year-old patient at the Children's Unit of
Napa State Hospital was the victim of a brutal homosexual assault by
other inmates.1 This attack received widespread publicity and was
brought to the attention of members of the state legislature.2 Some of
the factors which made possible this kind of incident were a lack of
sufficient staff, overadmissions to the Children's Unit, the admission of
overly-aggressive and destructive children, and overcrowded conditions
on the wards, all of which led to inadequate supervision.3
On August 1, 1969, in the wake of the publicity regarding this
assault, the director of California's Department of Mental Hygiene
(DM11) issued a directive regarding the Children's Unit at Napa, which
provided in part as follows: "Admission Changes. No minors with
history of overtly aggressive physical behavior or inappropriate sexual
behavior prior to admission will be received on juvenile court observa-
tions at the Napa State Hospital."4 The majority of such violent young
patients had been referred to the Children's Unit for observation and
diagnosis by the juvenile courts. 5 The immediate effect of the DMH's
directive regarding the admission of aggressive patients to the Children's
Unit was an increase in the number of severely disturbed children
incarcerated in county juvenile halls. 6
An administrative "solution" such as the one above, which closes
off avenues of treatment for severely mentally ill juvenile court wards
without offering any alternatives, can lead to a violation of the juvenile's
statutory and constitutional rights. A series of recent court decisions7
suggests that these children have a constitutional right to adequate and
appropriate treatment, which in far too many cases is not being provid-
ed. Emergency measures for dealing with this problem, as well as some
1. ARTHUR S. BOLTON & ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON SERVICES FOR MENTALLY ILL AND
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 7, n.9.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
7. See note 47 infra.
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long-range solutions, are possible if existing California statutes are
enforced. 8
The Constitutional Right to Treatment
for Mental Patients
The concept of a "right to treatment" for patients involuntarily
civilly confined to mental hospitals was first articulated by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum in 1960.9 Birnbaum's thesis was that the forced hospitaliza-
tion of mentally ill people without the provision of "adequate medical
treatment so that [the patient] may regain his health, and therefore his
liberty, as soon as possible" violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 10
There was no judicial recognition of the issue raised by Dr. Birn-
baum's initial article until 1966, when the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia decided Rouse v. Cameron." The court in Rouse
found that under section 21-562 of the District of Columbia Code, 2
patients involuntarily committed to a mental hospital in the District of
Columbia had a statutory right to treatment. Judge Bazelon," s writing
for the majority in Rouse, noted that even without such a statute, forced
confinement in a public mental hospital without treatment might violate
either the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 4 Fol-
lowing Rouse, the District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed the right to
treatment in a number of similar cases. 15
8. See notes 114-19 infra.
9. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
10. Id. at 503. Birnbaum does not explain his due process argument beyond the
statement that involuntary commitment without treatment "is not due process of law be-
cause it is not 'fair and just and proper.'" Id. at 504, quoting Solesbee v. Balkom, 339
U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter based his definition
of due process on "moral principles . . . deemed fundamental to a civilized society
.... " Id. He further explained that the most fundamental rights granted by the Con-
stitution are likely to be the least explicitly defined. Id. See generally Kadish, Meth-
odology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-a Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE
L.J. 319 (1957).
11. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
12. Section 21-562 of the District of Columbia Code specifies that anyone "hospi-
talized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be en-
titled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment." D.C. CODE ANN. ENCYCL. § 21-
562 (1966).
13. Judge Bazelon's first 25 years on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia are commemorated in a recent festschrift, much of which is de-
voted to the right to treatment. See 123 U. PA. L. REv. 243-508 (1974).
14. 373 F.2d at 453.
15. See In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Covington v. Harris, 419
F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby
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Other jurisdictions also began to recognize a constitutional right to
treatment.16 The Fifth Circuit accepted the concept in Donaldson v.
O'Connor.17  Judge Wisdom, writing for a unanimous court, found that
the right to treatment for patients involuntarily civilly committed to state
mental hospitals is guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment.-8 This
conclusion was based on the proposition that involuntary commitment
constitutes a "massive curtailment of liberty" which may be justified
only in terms of some "permissible governmental goal."'19 The type of
governmental power involved in involuntary commitment depends on
the nature of the patient's mental illness. A state exercises its police
power to commit a person who presents a danger to others. On the
other hand, a person who requires care and treatment is committed
through application of a state's parens patriae power. The court in
Donaldson held that if the state justifies commitment on the parens
patriae theory, treatment must be provided, "lest the involuntary com-
mitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of government power pro-
scribed by the due process clause."2 The court, however, did not so
narrowly circumscribe the right to treatment. According to Judge
Wisdom's analysis, a person who is dangerous to himself might be
committed under a mixture of parens patriae and police power ration-
ales. Nonetheless, the court found that in order to guarantee due
process rights, the distinction between police power and parens patriae
theories need not be determinative:
when the three central limitations on the government's power to de-
tain-that detention be in retribution for a specific offense; that
it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted after a pro-
ceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards are observed-
v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
16. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
1973). The trial court in the Northern District of Georgia had earlier held that there
was no constitutional right to treatment. Burnham v. Dep't of Public Health, 349 F.
Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
This case was consolidated for appeal with Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit resolved the conflict in favor of the right to
treatment. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). (The cases listed above
all dealt with the problems of adult mental patients.)
17. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion has provoked considerable comment. See, e.g., Note, Civil Commitment
and the Right to Treatment, 35 LA. L. REV. 563 (1975); Note, Right to Treatment for
Nondangerous Involuntary Civilly Committed Persons, 46 Miss. LJ. 345 (1975); Note,
Right to Adequate Psychiatric Treatment-an Illusory Guarantee for the Dangerous Pa-
tient, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 295 (1974).
18. 495 F.2d at 520.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 521.
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are absent, there must be a quid pro quo extended by the govern-
ment to justify confinement. 2 1
The court defined the quid pro quo as that treatment which "[w]ill help
[the patient] to be cured or to improve his mental condition. 22
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Donaldson, which appeared to estab-
lish firmly the constitutional right to treatment for persons involuntarily
civilly committed to public mental hospitals, was vacated by the Su-
preme Court on appeal.2 3 Although the Court found that Donaldson's
own civil rights had been violated by his lengthy confinement without
treatment in a Florida state hospital,24 it specifically declined to rule on
the "right of treatment" aspect of Donaldson's case.25 Instead, the
Court narrowed its ruling to the facts of the Donaldson case and found
that because Kenneth Donaldson was not dangerous, mere custodial
confinement was a denial of his due process right to liberty.26 Thus, the
Court indicated only that a nondangerous person cannot be confined
without treatment. The decision side-stepped two major questions
raised by the Fifth Circuit opinion: whether dangerous mentally ill
people have a right to treatment when they are involuntarily committed;
and whether a state may confine nondangerous mentally ill people if it
offers them treatment. Moreover, the Court failed to come to any
conclusion even as to the less controversial aspect of the Fifth Circuit
opinion, that wholly nondangerous patients have a right to treatment.28
Instead, the Court chose to follow the long-standing tradition of narrow-
ing its decision to the facts of the particular case.29 Perhaps the
Supreme Court will announce a constitutional right to treatment when
the proper case arises. In the meantime, the concept of a constitutional
right to treatment has gained wide acceptance within the legal profes-
sion30 and is well established by the weight of judicial authority in the
21. Id. at 522.
22. Id. at 520.
23. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
24. id. at 576.
25. Id. at 573.
26. Id. at 576.
27. Id. at 573.
28. See id. at 577-78 n.12.
29. Id. at 573-74. The Supreme Court frequently declines to answer constitutional
questions unless their resolution is absolutely necessary in the case before the Court.
See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171
(1957); Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); United States v. Spector, 343 U.S.
169 (1952); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
30. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV.
742 (1969); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1108 (1972); Symposium-
The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and
the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 I-ARv. L.
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lower courts." In addition, the right to treatment is guaranteed to
involuntarily committed mental patients by statute in a number of
jurisdictions.32
The Constitutional Right to Treatment for Juveniles
The Due Process Right to Treatment
Recent decisions have established the right to treatment perhaps
more firmly for juvenile offenders than for adult mental patients. 8
The underlying philosophy of the juvenile court system has been,
since its inception at the end of the nineteenth century, that child
offenders are not criminals and that they should not be tried and
sentenced in the same manner as adults. The juvenile court proceeding
was designed to make the child "feel that he is the object of [the state's]
care and solicitude."34  The motivating principle was that the child
should be "treated" and "rehabilitated" rather than punished for his
transgressions.35 This parens patriae philosophy has been consistently
used as the justification for denying procedural due process rights to
children.36
While most courts continue to pay lip service to the juvenile court
ideal, many others have now recognized that "the constitutional and
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to say the least---debata-
REV. 1282 (1973); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967);
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87
(1967).
31. See notes 14-15 & accompanying text supra.
32. In spite of the unsettled state of the constitutional question, many states have
statutes which guarantee the right to treatment for mental patients. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 66-344 (Supp. 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, §§ 12-1, 100-7 (Smith Hurd
Supp. 1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 225.15 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840 (1972);
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 15-03(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-7-46 (Supp. 1975). See also note 64 infra.
33. This body of law is founded on the principle that these children should be pro-
tected because of their youth, not necessarily because of their psychiatric problems. In
fact, many of these juveniles do have psychiatric problems, which contributed to their
becoming wards of the juvenile court. The failure of the juvenile court system to iden-
tify such children as specifically needing psychiatric care has been noted. See text ac-
companying note 100 infra.
34. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAtv. L. Rlv. 104, 120 (1909). The way in
which the juvenile courts work in reality has been severely criticized. See, e.g., P. MUR-
PHY, OUR KINDLY PARENT-TH STATE (1974).
35. From the beginning, treatment has been stressed in cases involving juveniles.
See In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 127, 96 P. 563, 564 (1908); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209
Iowa 813, 816, 229 N.W. 205, 207 (1929); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 50,
62 A. 198, 199 (1905); Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis.
651, 665, 79 N.W. 422, 427 (1899).
36. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
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ble."3 In Kent v. United States38 Justice Fortas recognized the basis of
the problem:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children. 39
Accordingly, due process rights previously denied have been ex-
tended to children in a number of Supreme Court decisions in the last
three decades.40 Nevertheless, because of a reluctance to abandon the
juvenile court ideal entirely and view juvenile court proceedings as
"criminal" in nature, juvenile offenders have not been accorded the full
range of procedural due process rights granted to adults. In McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania,4 the Supreme Court held that juveniles have no sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. The Court supported this holding by
stating that
[t]here is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as
a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile pro-
ceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end
to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding. 42
Were the juvenile court process equated with the adult criminal trial, the
McKeiver court believed, "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sym-
pathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contem-
plates" would be ignored. 4.
37. Id.
38. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
39. Id. at 556.
40. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (fifth amendment protection against
double jeopardy applied to juvenile court proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967) (accused's fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel, to be informed of the
charges, and against self-incrimination applied to juvenile delinquency hearing: "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone"); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) ("basic requirements of due process and fairness" must
be afforded to juveniles); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (due process clause
prohibited use of confession of 14-year-old obtained before juvenile had seen judge, law-
yer, parent, or other friendly adult); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (due process
clause barred use of 15-year-old's confession).
41. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
42. Id. at 545.
43. Id. at 550. The California courts have consistently held that children have
no constitutional right to a jury trial. See In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 332, 228 P.
467, 472 (1924); In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 456-57, 450 P.2d 296, 302-03, 75
Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1969) (by implication); In re T.R.S., 1 Cal. App. 3d 178, 182, 81
Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1969); In re Joe R., 12 Cal. App. 3d 80, 84, 90 Cal. Rptr. 530,
532 (1970). The courts have specifically found that this rule was still sound in spite
of the Supreme Court's holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See In re Ste-
ven C., 9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 260-61, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1970). McKeiver does not
necessarily indicate a reversal of the recent trend toward affording due process rights
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This restriction of due process safeguards is not, however, unquali-
fied. Through reasoning similar to that used by Judge Wisdom in
Donaldson, courts have recognized that juveniles who are confined
without the due process rights available to adults have a right to
treatment. The possibility of long-term confinement without complete
procedural due process can be upheld only if it furthers some "permissi-
ble governmental goal."44  In In re Gault4" the Supreme Court recog-
nized that
to the extent that the special procedures for juveniles are thought
to be justified by the special consideration and treatment afforded
them, there is reason to doubt that juveniles always receive the ben-
efits of such a quid pro quo. . . .The high rate of juvenile
recidivism casts some doubt upon the adequacy of treatment af-
forded juveniles ...
In fact some courts have recently indicated that appropriate
treatment is essential to the validity of juvenile custody, and there-
fore that a juvenile may challenge the validity of his custody on
the ground that he is not in fact receiving any special treatment. 46
The concept has developed that without the quid pro quo of
treatment, there can be little justification for the denial of full constitu-
tional rights to children who come within the juvenile court process. A
number of recent decisions, relying on the "quid pro quo" argument,
have found that children who are wards of the juvenile court have a
right to rehabilitative treatment under the United States Constitution
and relevant state statutes.47 The due process right to treatment for
juvenile offenders, like the right to treatment for adult mental patients,
has been well documented and need not be further explored here.48
to children. In Breed v. Jones, the Court stated, "[w]ith the exception of McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, the Court's response ... has been to make applicable in juvenile pro-
ceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions."
421 U.S. 528-29 (1975) (emphasis added).
44. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S.
563 (1975).
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
46. Id. at 22-23, n.30.
47. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley,
359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), enforcing 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In-
mates of Boys Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
48. See generally Bazelon, Whose Needy Children?, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237
(1975); Faust, Implementing the Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
256 (1972); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Proc-
ess?, 57 GEo. LJ. 848 (1969); Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAMs-
mY L.Q. 279 (1972); Note, Institutionalized Juveniles Have a Right to Rehabilitative
Treatment, 4 CAPrrAL U.L. REv. 85 (1974); Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?,
1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 157 (1973).
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The Eighth Amendment Right to Treatment for Mentally M11 Juveniles
The Supreme Court has ruled that a status, such as addiction to
narcotics or mental illness, may not be punished as a crime. In Robin-
son v. California,49 the Court determined that imprisonment of people
who have not been found guilty of any criminal act constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.50
The Court's reasoning in Robinson is applicable to juveniles. First,
no juvenile is found guilty of a criminal act. Even those youths
commonly termed "delinquents" come within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court not because they have committed crimes, but rather
because they have committed acts which would be deemed criminal if
perpetrated by an adult.,' The purpose of juvenile court jurisdiction,
even for these minors, is consistently said to be rehabilitative, not
punitive; treatment, rather than retribution, is the stated goal of confine-
ment. Thus, in Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck,52 the court
held that although the theory behind the boys' confinement was rehabili-
tation, the reality of their incarceration amounted to punishment.3
Consequently, the court enjoined the use of the facility's confinement
cells,5 4 specified minimal standards of health care, clothing, bedding,
and personal hygiene supplies, 55 and ordered the institution to submit a
plan for psychiatric counseling. 56
Similarly, in Nelson v. Heyne,5 7 the court held that in administer-
ing tranquilizing drugs to incarcerated juveniles to control their excited
behavior, reformatory officials violated the inmates' eighth amendment
rights. The court reached this conclusion by finding that the control
measures used were disproportionate to the behavior which had in-
voked them, and that the severity of the method offended "broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decen-
cy."5  The court concluded that the state may not use "'cruel and
unusual' means to accomplish its benevolent end of reformation." 59
Thus, even when youths who have violated particular laws are
involved, and even if some punitive measures are condoned, -the methods
of maintaining order may not be disproportionate to the disruptive acts,
49. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
50. Id. at 666.
51. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1975).
52. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
53. Id. at 1366.
54. Id. at 1367.
55. Id. at 1373.
56. Id. at 1374.
57. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 356.
59. Id. at 357.
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and the goal of the punishment must be rehabilitative. Mere con-
finement without treatment, since it cannot be said to foster the goal
of rehabilitation, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Many youths, however, are confined despite the fact that they have
violated no laws.6° The California statutes which provide for juvenile
court jurisdiction over youths who are found to be "incorrigible" or
dangerous to the public because of mental illness are typical of state
juvenile provisions which allow for confinement of minors who have not
violated laws.6' In the case of these juveniles, the Court's reasoning in
Robinson applies with particular force, as the "status" nature of their
"offenses" is apparent. If these minors are confined without treatment,
their incarceration must be deemed punishment, and it must constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth amendment.
California Juveniles and the Right to Treatment
In California, the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court has been
recently confirmed. 62  In addition, the right of state juvenile court
wards to rehabilitative treatment is supported by the purpose clause of
the California Juvenile Court Law63 as well as by statutes which guaran-
tee treatment to involuntarily civilly committed mental patients.6 4 Both
section 60165 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which
60. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY, JUVENILE COURT PROCESSES-REPORT OF
THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE 5 (1970).
61. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 600-01 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975).
62. See In re J.L.D., 25 Cal. App. 3d 86, 100 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1972) (since the
juvenile court exists to help juvenile offenders, rather than to punish them, a decision
to commit a minor to the Youth Authority may not be made until the issue of the court's
jurisdiction has been raised and all relevant evidence heard); T.N.G. v. Superior Ct.,
4 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1971) (the underlying protective phil-
osophy of the juvenile court prevents the adverse use of juvenile arrest and detention
records); In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1970) (juvenile
offender should not have been committed to the Youth Authority without a showing that
treatment in a less restrictive program was ineffective in rehabilitating him).
63. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1975). "The purpose of
this chapter is to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the State; to preserve
and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody
of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be
adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own
family, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally
construed to carry out these purposes." Id.
64. See, e.g., id. §§ 5001-02, 5008(c), 5150, 5213, 5230, 5250, 5260, 5300, 5303,
5327, 6250 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975).
65. Id. § 601 (West Supp. 1975). Section 601 is entitled "minors habitually refus-
ing to obey parents; minors in danger of leading immoral life." This section provides
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
describes incorrigible minors, and section 600(c)66 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, which describes youths dangerous to the public be-
cause of mental illness, are used to justify the confinement of children
whose antisocial behavior is symptomatic of mental illness. If the
behavior which has led to confinement is a result of a mental disorder,
the state has a dual obligation to provide these children with appropriate
treatment, under the combined authority of the adult mental patient
cases 67 and the "right to treatment"68 cases for juvenile offenders.
The Right to Adequate and Effective Treatment
Although there can be little question that juvenile court wards in
California have a right to treatment under case law and by statute, 9 the
issue arises as to what type of treatment the state must provide in order
to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements. The courts have
articulated numerous standards by which to measure the treatment
provided by the state to its wards. 70  Among the varying standards
which Professor Schwitzgebel 1 of Harvard Medical School finds to have
been used by the courts are "suitable" treatment, 72 "adequate" treat-
ment,73 "effective" treatment, 74 "curative" treatment, 75 "appropriate"
that "any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuses to obey
the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian, or custodian, or
who is beyond the control of such person, or who from any cause is in danger of leading
an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." Id. With one exception,
the disposition- available to the juvenile court are the same for these minors as they
are for juveniles who have committed offenses which would be crimes if perpetrated by
an adult. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY, JUVENILE COURT PROCESSES-RE-
PORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 (1970).
66. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1972). See note 114 infra.
67. See notes 15-16 supra.
68. See note 47 supra.
69. See notes 62-64 supra.
70. See Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need
for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARv. CIV. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
513 (1973).
71. Id. at 519.
72. Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Application of D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 5,
285 A.2d 283, 287 (App. Div. 1971).
73. R:zuse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Cook v. Cicone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo.
1970); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d
908 (1968).
74. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp.
1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387
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treatment,7 "proper" treatment,7 7 "realistic opportunity to be cured or
improve,' 78 and "bona fide effort to cure or improve patient."1 9
Schwitzgebel notes that behind the diverse standards announced by the
courts appears to be the assumption that treatment should be effective in
order to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements.8 1
In the early right to treatment cases, the courts appeared reluctant
to define with any degree of specificity what types of treatment were
required. In In re Jones,"' for example, a District of Columbia court
noted that psychiatry is a developing discipline and that a variety of
treatment alternatives are open to any hospital administrator.82 The
court therefore concluded that courts "may not decide whether the
Hospital has made the best possible decision, but only that it has made a
permissible decision based on relevant information and within the broad
range of discretion given to the Hospital administrator." 83
More recent decisions, however, indicate that courts are prescribing
quantitative standards as well as specific qualitative measures to be
implemented by the state in order to guarantee adequate treatment to
inmates in state facilities. In Martarella v. Kelley,84 the court enunciat-
ed specific standards and criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness
of the juvenile institution in question. This direct court intervention
into the internal administration of the facility was justified on grounds of
the history of "ignored reports over a period of generations . . . all
urging reform and improvement of juvenile detention facilities, and all
being largely, if not altogether disregarded and treated as a mere pious
sentiment."85  Among the specific actions ordered by the court in
Martarella to insure adequate treatment were adding more staff mem-
(M.D. Ala.) aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Clatter-
buck v. Harris, 295 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Kearse, 28 App. Div.
2d 910, 282 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (1967).
75. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 362, 88 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1967).
76. Clatterbuck v. Harris, 295 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Kearse,
28 App. Div. 2d 910, 282 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (1967).
77. In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972).
78. -Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 374 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala.), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
79. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
80. Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV. Crv. RiGTs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 513,
520 (1973).
81. 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972).
82. Id. at 429.
83. Id. See also Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
84. 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
85. Id. at 482.
bers, providing staff with better training, and making psychiatrists
available to the inmates.86
In Morales v. Turman s8 a case which also involved a juvenile
detention facility, the court was even more specific in its ruling on what
constituted adequate treatment. The court found that the children
incarcerated in the institution had a right to
care that conform[ed] to the following minimally acceptable pro-
fessional standards:
1. Adequate infirmary facilities, properly utilized.
2. Access to medical staff without delay or interference.
3. A psychiatric staff, consisting of psychiatrists certified by
the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology as qualified in
the field of child psychiatry, sufficient in number to assure treat-
ment of individual children who require individual therapy; ef-
fective training and supervision of other treatment staff; and co-
ordination of treatment programs.
4. A psychological staff, to consist of psychologists holding
either Master's degrees or Doctorates in psychology and experi-
enced in work with adolescents, sufficient in number to meet the
needs of the children.
5. Provision of either individual or group psychotherapy for
every child for whom it is indicated.
6. Sufficient psychiatric nursing assistance.
7. Sufficient medical staff and nursing staff to provide ef-
fective preventive and curative care for the health of all juveniles.
8. Freedom from indiscriminate, unsupervised, unnecessary,
or excessive medication, particularly psychotropic medication. 8
Adequacy of Treatment Received by California Juveniles
Application of the standards enunciated in Martarella and Morales
reveals serious doubt whether the mentally ill children committed to
state hospitals in California are receiving "adequate" or "effective"
treatment.89 Following the 1969 incident at Napa, a Select Committee
on Services for Mentally Ill and Handicapped Children was created by
the California Assembly.9" In January of 1970, a preliminary report
was submitted to this committee by Arthur Bolton & Associates, who
had been hired to investigate the problem. 91
This investigation revealed many of the same conditions within the
Napa and Camarillo State Hospitals 92 that had prompted court interven-
86. Id. at 483-86.
87. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
88. Id. at 105.
89. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. These two institutions are the only California state hospitals with special facil-
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tion in Morales: shortage of properly trained staff and lack of ongoing
training programs for them, dull and unpleasant physical surroundings,
overreliance on the ward television set as a substitute for active treat-
ment programs, crowded dormitories, inadequate supervision of pa-
tients, and insufficient regulation of the Children's Unit staff by the
hospital administration. 93 The preliminary Bolton report to the Assem-
bly Select Committee went so far as to state that "the State hospital is
not an appropriate place for the treatment of children."9 4
The language of section 502 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, 5 which explains the philosophy behind the California Juvenile
Court Law, presupposes that when the state removes a child from the
custody of his parents; the state will provide "custody, care and disci-
pline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been
given by his parents."96  Patrick Murphy, a critic of the American
juvenile justice system, has pointed out that if the state is to assume the
responsibility for removing a child from its natural family, the state then
has a duty to properly care for the child. Obviously, neglect of the
child's health and welfare is no more morally and legally justified when
perpetrated by the government than when the natural parent is at
fault.' 7
Although it is alarming that conditions at the California state
hospitals have been found to be inadequate for children, it is even more
distressing that many of the most severely disturbed children within the
California juvenile justice system are getting no treatment at all, as there
is a severe shortage of facilities that are willing to accept a violent or
aggressive juvenile court ward.98
On July 25, 1974, Supervisor James A. Hayes submitted a motion
to the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County which called for
adequate treatment for these severely mentally ill juvenile court wards.
Supervisor Hayes noted that children who come under section 600(c) of
the Welfare and Institutions Code, which describes youths who have
ities for children under 15 years old. Adolescent programs, designed for children 15
and older, have been initiated at DeWitt and Mendocino State Hospitals. Children un-
der the age of 15 are admitted to other state hospitals only for short stays; if longer
treatment is required, they are transferred to Napa or Camarillo. AiRTHui S. BOLTON
& ASSOCIATES, A REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMrrTEE ON MENTALLY ILL AND
HANDICAPPED CHILD. EN 147 (1970).
93. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-6.
94. Id. at 10.
95. See note 63 supra.
96. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
97. P. MuI-Y, OuR KINDLY PARENT-THE STATE 122 (1974).
98. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra. See also Motion by Supervisor James
A. Hayes, Exhibit A, in Petition for Writ of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831
(L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
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been declared "physically dangerous to the public because of mental or
physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality," were not receiving ade-
quate care and treatment. The supervisor stated that when the proba-
tion department sent these children to the Camarillo State Hospital or to
the psychiatric unit of the University of Southern California Medical
Center, they were often returned to the juvenile hall because they were
"too hard to handle."99  Hayes then described the problem in greater
detail:
[B]oth Juvenile Hall and MacLaren Hall are not designed and [are]
ill-equipped in facilities and personnel to treat these cases . . .
often violent, assaultive or self-destructive.
I'm told that approximately 70 of these children currently are
wards of Juvenile Court. But, in truth, if our responsibility to iden-
tify a child as mentally ill were carried through that number would
be far greater. Proper psychiatric evaluation of children in our
juvenile system is a myth.
There is an extreme reluctance on the part of our Juvenile
Courts to attach what is considered the stigma of 600(c) to a child
and sadly-the courts are painfully aware there are no facilities to
care for a child placed in that category.
I have gathered evidence on specific cases where children are
or have been confined under what only can be described as snake
pit conditions because facilities have not been provided. 100
The Lack of Suitable Facilities and the Juvenile Court
Ward's Right to Treatment
The issues raised by Supervisor Hayes are illustrated in a recent
Los Angeles case. The fact situation in Doe v. Hufford'01 demonstrates
the dilemma faced by conscientious juvenile court officials when con-
fronted by a court ward who is deemed "too violent" for placement in
the state hospital or other public facility. The plaintiff in Doe, a
severely disturbed teenager, was adjudicated a ward of the Los Angeles
juvenile court in November 1973, pursuant to section 601 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code.10 2 Subsequently, Ms. Doe was confined in
the juvenile hall from November, 1973 until June 6, 1974, except for
99. Motion by Supervisor James A. Hayes at 1, Exhibit A, in Petition for Writ
of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29,
1975).
100. Id. at 1-2.
101. Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975). Ms. Doe's
name and the name of the hospital where she was treated have been omitted in order
to protect Ms. Doe's privacy.
102. The petition alleged that Ms. Doe was beyond her parents' control, that she
had assaulted her father, that she left home without permission, and that she had as-
saulted a police officer.
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three days spent at one hospital and one week at another. She was
discharged from each of these hospitals because of her violent tenden-
cies. When the hospitals found that they could not treat her, she was
returned to juvenile hall, which had no treatment facilities for severely
disturbed children. While Ms. Doe spent nearly seven months in isola-
tion at juvenile hall, the probation department approached other psychi-
atric hospitals in the Los Angeles area on her behalf, but all refused to
treat her, owing to her violent and self-destructive symptoms. 0 3
On June 5, 1974, the juvenile court placed Ms. Doe on a tempo-
rary basis in a private psychiatric hospital in the Los Angeles
area. 04 This placement was finalized by a court order of June 21,
1974.15 In his order, Judge Hogoboom justified placement of Ms. Doe
in an expensive private hospital on the grounds that she had been
detained far too long in the juvenile hall, that she was severely disturbed,
and that no other facilities were available for her care and treatment. 10 6
The judge noted that it was almost impossible to place adolescents with
a history of violent and aggressive behavior, especially those who had
previously been hospitalized or diagnosed as schizophrenic. According
to the chief psychiatrist of the Los Angeles County Probation Depart-
ment's psychiatric clinic, such minors were refused admission to both
public and private treatment programs because of their history of attacks
on hospital staff, other patients, and property.0 7
Judge Hogoboom indicated in the order that Ms. Doe's placement
in the private hospital on June 5, 1974, had been on the understanding
that her parents' medical insurance would cover the cost of her treat-
ment there. When it was discovered that the insurance would not cover
the treatment, the juvenile court intervened. In spite of the facts that
the cost of treatment at this hospital far exceeded the usual rate, and that
Ms. Doe's violent outbreaks .had cost hundreds of dollars in property
damage to the hospital in her first week there, the court ordered that her
treatment in this facility continue, at county expense, while other ave-
nues of funding were explored. The court concluded its order with the
statement that "[t]he question we may well need to pose for ourselves as
we decide this girl's future is not can we afford to help her but rather
can we afford not to."10 8
103. See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 3-4, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831
(L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
104. Id. at 4.
105. Minute Order of Judge Hogoboom, Exhibit L, in Petition for Writ of Mandate,
Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. quoting Dr. Scott Schell, Chief Psychiatrist of the Los Angeles County
Probation Department's Psychiatric Clinic.
108. Id. at 8.
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By November 14, 1974, when the hospital made a claim against
Los Angeles County for payment for Ms. Doe's treatment, the bill for
her care at the hospital totaled $21,993.20.1°9 The psychiatrist's bill
for the same period of time amounted to $3,640.00.110 In January of
1975, the Los Angeles counsel informed the hospital by letter that the
county would contribute toward Ms. Doe's treatment only $550.00
per month, which is the maximum board and care rate established by
the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County for placement of juven-
ile court wards in private institutions not under contract with Los An-
geles County.' As a result of the county's refusal to pay for the full
cost of Ms. Doe's treatment, a petition for writ of mandate and a com-
plaint for injunctive and declaratory relief were filed on her behalf on
January 29, 1975.112
Ms. Doe's claim for relief was based in part on sections 727, 731,
739, and 741 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitu-
tions, and the purpose clause of the California Juvenile Court Law." 3
The sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code on which Ms.
Doe relied discuss various types of treatment available to youths subject
to juvenile court jurisdiction. Section 727 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code provides that
When a minor is adjudged a dependent child of the court, on
the ground that he is a person described by Section 600, the court
may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision,
custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of such minor, includ-
ing medical treatment .... 114
109. Petition for Writ of Mandate at 6, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A.
County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
110. Id.
111. See Letter from John H. Larson, County Counsel, County of Los Angeles, to
Ms. Doe's hospital, Jan. 3, 1975, Exhibit J, in Petition for Writ of Mandate, Doe v.
Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975). See note 101
supra.
112. See note 101 supra. Ms. Doe has made great progress, has been released from
the hospital, and is presently enrolled in a university. Los Angeles County, meanwhile,
has paid approximately $26,000 toward Ms. Doe's hospital and psychiatrist bills. Inter-
view with Ms. Doe's attorney, Robert L. Walker, Youth Law Center, in San Francisco,
Cal., Nov. 14, 1975.
113. See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 14, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831
(L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
114. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1975). Section 600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code describes dependent or neglected persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. These include persons under 18 who are in need of
parental care or control, homeless children, children who are dangerous because of men-
tal illness, and children who are neglected or mistreated by their parents. Id. § 600(a)-
(d) (West 1972).
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Section 727 further allows the court to commit the minor to the custody
of a "probation officer, to be boarded out or placed in some . . .
suitable private institution. ... 11-
Section 731 provides for treatment of minors who have violated a
law or a juvenile court order,"" while section 739 authorizes the court
to obtain needed "medical, surgical, dental or other remedial care" for
its wards after notice to the child's parents." 7 Section 741 provides
that the probation officer may
obtain the services of such psychiatrists, psychologists, or other clin-
ical experts as may be required to assist in determining the appro-
priate treatment of the minor and as may be required in the con-
duct or implementation of such treatment."18
Section 741 further requires the county to pay for such psychiatric
services."19
It seems clear based on the foregoing Welfare and Institutions
Code sections that the court order of June 21, 1974, ordering the county
to pay for private care for Ms. Doe was valid, especially in view of the
fact that all other avenues of less expensive treatment had been exhaust-
ed. The alternative to the private care was that Ms. Doe, who had
committed no crime, would remain in solitary confinement in juvenile
hall, receiving no treatment at all.
Nonetheless, counsel for Los Angeles County read sections 900
and 913 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as justification for the
county's refusal to pay for Ms. Doe's court-ordered private treatment.
The county interpreted section 900 as prohibiting it from paying more
than the maximum rate previously established for court wards in private
facilities. Section 900(a) reads as follows:
If it is necessary that provision be made for the expense of support
and maintenance of a ward or dependent child of the juvenile court
• . .the order providing for the care and custody of such ward,
dependent child or other minor person shall direct that the whole
expense of support and maintenance of such ward, dependent child
or other minor person, up to the amount of twenty dollars ($20)
per month be paid from the county treasury and may direct that
an amount up to any maximum amount per month established by
the board of supervisors of the county be so paid. The board of
supervisors of each county is hereby authorized to establish, either
generally or for individual wards or dependent children or accord-
ing to classes or groups of wards or dependent children, a maximum
amount which the court may order the county to pay for such sup-
port and maintenance. All orders made pursuant to the provisions
115. Id. § 727(c) (West Supp. 1975).
116. Id. § 731 (West 1972).
117. Id. § 739 (West Supp. 1975).
118. Id. § 741 (West 1972).
119. Id.
of this section shall state the amounts to be so paid from the county
treasury, and such amounts shall constitute legal charges against
the county. 120
Los Angeles County refused to pay more than the $550 per month
maximum amount established by the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors.' Although the language of section 900 would presuma-
bly allow the board of supervisors to establish a maximum rate for the
care of Ms. Doe as an individual that would cover the full cost of her
court-ordered treatment, the county did not feel compelled by either
statute or court order to do so.
The county also relied on the fact that the language of section 913
of *the Welfare and Institutions Code, which allows the county to con-
tract with private hospitals and physicians for the care of juvenile court
wards, is discretionary rather than mandatory.
22
In light of the arguments outlined above, the pertinent question
appears to be whether a county may refuse to pay for the court-ordered
treatment of a juvenile court ward when treatment in an expensive
private facility is the only viable alternative to no treatment at all. One
commentator 2 3 has framed this issue as follows: "May juvenile courts
abrogate the promise of treatment and rehabilitation to any juvenile,
regardless of his condition, handicap, or behavior problem, because of
the lack of adequate facilities or treatment capabilities?"' 2 4
Lack of Funds or Existing Facilities As a Basis
for Denial of Constitutional Rights
Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed this issue in Haziel v. United States"2 5 and concluded,
"we . . . cannot ignore the mockery of a benevolent statute unbacked
by adequate facilities."' 2 6  Other courts have recognized that inade-
quate treatment of mental patients cannot be justified by lack of re-
120. Id. § 900 (West Supp. 1975).
121. Letter from John H. Larson, County Counsel, County of Los Angeles, to Ms.
Doe's hospital, Jan. 3, 1975, Exhibit J, in Petition for Writ of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford,
Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975). See note 101 supra.
122. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 913 (West 1972). This section clearly pro-
vides authority under which Los Angeles County could have contracted with the hospital
and Ms. Doe's psychiatrist for any amount, up to and including the full cost of Ms.
Doe's treatment.
123. Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,
57 GEo. L.J. 848 (1969).
124. Id. at 875.
125. 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
126. Id. at 1280.
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sources,' holding that lack of funds or facilities is no excuse for a
state's neglect of its wards.128
In Morales v. Turman,'2 9 the court found that juveniles incarcerat-
ed subject to the jurisdiction of the Texas Youth Authority had both a
statutory right and a constitutional right to treatment, but that such
rights had been abridged because the institutions in question failed to
provide minimal elements of an adequate treatment plan.'3 0 The court
held that a state may not deny juvenile court wards' constitutional rights
by refusing to create alternatives to confinement in substandard institu-
tions. The court ordered two juvenile detention facilities closed, and
also insisted that alternative facilities be created to meet the needs of
Texas juvenile court wards. The court noted that many of the children
incarcerated in detention centers could be better treated in less con-
trolled environments. Recognizing, however, that some severely dis-
turbed children required close supervision in a restrictive facility, the
court stated that these juveniles must receive actual treatment while
being so confined: "They may not be abandoned as hopeless and simply
warehoused until they grow too old for juvenile facilities."'' The court
insisted that those children with the most severe problems must receive
individualized attention.132
In Martarella v. Kelley, 3' a case in which the right to treatment
was extended to children classified as "Persons in Need of Supervision"
(PINS), the court ordered the City of New York to increase the
numbers of staff at children's detention centers in order that better
treatment might be provided, stating
A deficiency of personnel . . . cannot be accepted either logically
or constitutionally as a rationale for defining the needs of those en-
titled to treatment. If more staff members are necessary to do the
job, the City must furnish them in order to meet its constitutional
obligations. 13 4
The court recognized that to comply with this directive, the city would
have to increase its expenditures; it justified the order by saying that
"the taxpayers are called upon only to meet the constitutional rights of
the City's own children."' 35
127. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
128. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
129. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 125.
132. Id. at 126.
133. 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
134. Id. at 481.
135. Id. at 482.
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Courts considering the rights of adult prisoners have drawn analo-
gous conclusions, holding that the state may not deny constitutional
fights because of lack of funds or existing facilities. In Hamilton v.
Love,... prisoners awaiting trial sought declaratory and injunctive relief
based on their contention that the conditions at an Arkansas county jail
subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment, depriving them of
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. Defendants pointed out that
a new jail was being built and that extraordinary measures were being
taken to bring prisoners speedily to trial in order to relieve the "gross
overcrowding"' 13 7 in the jail. Defendants also stipulated that they would
make "reasonable improvements." Two months later, however, the
court found that many of the worst conditions had not been remedied.
Defendants contended that to make costly physical improvements to the
old jail would be "throw[ing] good money after bad,"'138 as the old jail
would be used for only a few more years. The court held nevertheless
that
[i]nadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for
the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights. If the
state cannot obtain the resources to detain persons awaiting trial
in accordance with minimum constitutional standards, then the
state will simply not be permitted to detain such persons. 139
Dr. Birnbaum suggested a similar remedy in his first right to
treatment article: 140 if the state fails to provide treatment for its involun-
tarily civilly committed mental patients, it should be required to release
them, in spite of possible dangers to the community which might result
from their release. Although the Supreme Court in Donaldson declined
to reach this conclusion, it did rule that nondangerous patients must be
released if they are not being treated.' 41
The treat or release idea, however, not only poses a potential threat
to the safety of the community; it is not always in the best interest of the
patient. In Lake v. Cameron, 42 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia found that the plaintiff, who had been committed to a
136. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
137. Id. at 1185.
138. Id. at 1190.
139. Id. at 1194. See also Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972) (in-
adequate heat in correctional institution, justified by state as owing to lack of funds, held
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment); Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (state's lack of funds no excuse for use of strap
as punishment device). The court in Jackson emphasized: "Humane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured by dollar considera-
tions." Id. at 580.
140. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960).
141. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
142. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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mental hospital after police had found her wandering aimlessly in the
streets, should be offered a less restrictive alternative than confinement
in the public mental hospital. One such suggested alternative was that
the woman wear an identity tag so that police could return her to her
home if she wandered away again.143 While agreeing with the majority
that Mrs. Lake should not be incarcerated in the public mental hospital,
Judge J. Skelly Wright was appalled at the idea of returning an infirm
and somewhat senile old woman to the streets with only an identity card
to protect her. Judge Wright reminded the majority that the plaintiff
had previously been molested in her wanderings. He voiced his con-
cern that death from attackers or natural causes might be the result
of Mrs. Lake's unconditional release.144
Similar objections can be raised to the release of severely disturbed
juveniles who are not presently receiving adequate care in state institu-
tions or county juvenile halls. Once judicial authority has established
that the state has a right to confine and a duty to treat a juvenile, the
state should not be permitted because of inadequate funds to abrogate
its legal and moral obligation to provide treatment.
Compelling Adequate and Effective Treatment
The juvenile courts in California derive their traditional powers
from Article Six 45 of the state constitution. In addition, these courts
are invested with jurisdiction to perform certain executive functions. For
example, sections 509 and 509.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
provide for judicial inspection of juvenile detention centers. If the
judge finds, on inspection, -that a particular youth facility is inadequate,
he or she may order the institution closed until the problems have been
corrected. 4 6 It might be inferred from such provisions granting execu-
tive authority to the juvenile court that, as a court of equity, a California
juvenile court may direct the appropriate governmental body to provide
whatever treatment is necessary for its wards in order to give force and
meaning to statutory and constitutional guarantees of treatment..47
The issue of the extent to which the juvenile court may compel
county action was raised in the pleadings in Doe v. Hufford,148 but there
does not seem to be any case law on the subject in California. Similar
143. Id. at 661.
144. Id. at 664.
145. "The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of ap-
peal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. All except justice courts are
courts of record." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
146. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 509, 509.5 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975).
147. Cf. United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971).
148. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 19-20, Doe v. Hufford,
Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
cases, however, -have arisen in at least two other jurisdictions, and in
both instances, -the court ruled that it possessed ample authority to order
the executive branch to take specific action in order to guarantee the
right to treatment for juvenile court wards.
In In re Joyce Z,149 a Pennsylvania juvenile court was faced with
the problem of a severely retarded child who required lifelong special
care in order to survive. The administrator of the state hospital and
school for the retarded testified that owing to overcrowding and under-
staffing, Joyce would receive only minimal custodial care at the state
facility. A special foster home was found which could provide the
necessary care and treatment, but the cost was higher than the usual
county allocation for foster care. The juvenile court, after ruling that
Joyce had a right to treatment based on constitutional as well as statuto-
ry grounds, ordered treatment for her in the special foster home at state
expense and further ordered county child welfare and mental health
agencies to cooperate in assigning the youth a caseworker.
In In re Welfare of J.E.C., 150 a Minnesota court specifically or-
dered the state's Department of Corrections to provide a program for
dangerous juveniles which would assure the protection of the public
while at the same time treating the juvenile offender. The court con-
cluded:
It is the function of the Courts to determine when a person should
be deprived of his liberty, whether this deprivation is to be by pro-
bation, incarceration, or otherwise and thus the method to be used
in rehabilitating him. The Courts also have the function of deter-
mining whether the public safety requires a person's incarceration.
The judicial branch of government thus may require the executive
branch to carry out the needs of the judicial system, and to fulfilll
its statutory duties, by providing a program which will both better
habilitate children, and better protect the public .... 151
By the same type of reasoning, it could be argued that -the court order of
June 21, 1974,152 which directed Los Angeles County to pay the cost of
Ms. Doe's private care, was a valid and necessary exercise of judicial
authority.
In spite of the court order, however, the Los Angeles Board of
Supervisors, viewing Welfare and Institutions Code sections 900 and
913 as discretionary, ignored the directions of the juvenile court and
chose neither to pay the full cost of Ms. Doe's care, nor to negotiate a
149. 7 JUVENILE Cr. DIGEST 14-16 (1975) (No. 2035-69, Pa. Ct. C.P., Allegheny
County 1975).
150. 6 JUVENILE CT. DIGEST 459 (1975) (No. 75604, Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin
County, Feb., 1975).
151. Id. at 463-64.
152. Minute order of Judge Hogoboom, Exhibit L, in Petition for Writ of Mandate,
Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
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special contract with her hospital.15 3 Counsel for Ms. Doe argued that
to elect not to contract for such services is to thwart the clear intent of
these statutes and to deny adequate treatment to the severely disturbed
juvenile court ward for whom no public treatment facilities currently
exist. 154
An administrative decision not to contract for desperately needed
facilities appears possible if sections 900 and 913 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code are narrowly construed. Nevertheless, the practical
result of such an interpretation of these code sections is that many
severely disturbed juveniles, like Ms. Doe, whom public institutions
refuse to accept because they are too "hard to handle," are kept for long
periods of time in solitary confinement in juvenile halls.' 55 Such
lengthy confinement of mentally ill minors in facilities which do not
provide psychiatric treatment may be cruel and unusual punishment
under the tests of Nelson and Robinson.5 ' Moreover, confinement
without treatment fails to provide the quid pro quo required to justify
the denial of full due process rights to juveniles as well as to mental
patients. A narrow construction of sections 900 and 913 as applied in
the Doe case may therefore deprive mentally ill juveniles of their eighth
and fourteenth amendment rights. When a right originating in the
United States Constitution conflicts with a state statute, the supremacy
clause requires that the constitutional right prevail.' 5 7  Furthermore,
such an interpretation of these sections contravenes the therapeutic
purposes of section 502 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 58 There-
fore, in order to avoid unconstitutional results, to comply with the stated
purposes of the California Juvenile Court Law, and to give force and
meaning to sections 727, 731, 739, and 741 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, sections 900 and 913 must be liberally construed according
to the dictates of the purpose clause of the Juvenile Court Law.159 Such
liberal construction would avoid the harsh results of Los Angeles Coun-
153. Letter from John H. Larson, County Counsel, County of Los Angeles, to
Ms. Doe's hospital, Jan. 3, 1975, in Petition for Writ of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford, Civil
No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975). See note 101 supra.
154. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 22, Doe v. Hufford,
Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1975).
155. See Motion by Supervisor James A. Hayes at 2, Exhibit A, in Petition for Writ
of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29,
1975).
156. See notes 49-59 & accompanying text supra.
157. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Mc-
Cray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 186
(1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); M'Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
158. See note 63 supra.
159. Id.
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ty's interpretation and would insure that counties would be required to
furnish needed care and treatment to their juvenile court wards.
The Need for Treatment Programs at the Local Level
Two recent cases have, paradoxically, exacerbated the problem of
where to place mentally ill juveniles by extending to children due
process rights formerly reserved for adults.
The court of appeal in In re L.L. 160 held that the juvenile court
could not directly place minors in a state mental hospital without a
conservatorship proceeding pursuant to the provisions of the Lanter-
man-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. 161  The petitioner in L.L. had been
placed by the juvenile court in Napa State Hospital following a section
601162 adjudication. The court of appeal held that L. could not be
committed to the state mental hospital unless he or his parents agreed to
the hospitalization on a voluntary basis'63 or a conservatorship proceed-
ing was instituted pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
5350(a).' 64  The court emphasized that a conservator may be appoint-
ed only if the minor in question is "gravely disabled" 16 as a result of a
mental disorder.'66 Although the juvenile court is empowered to order
psychiatric treatment for its wards,1 67 the court of appeal in L.L. ruled
160. 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1974).
161. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-401 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975).
162. See note 65 supra.
163. See CA. WELF. & INs'VNs CODE § 6000 (West Supp. 1975) (providing for
voluntary admission to state mental hospitals and institutions). Section 6000(b) allows
a parent or guardian to "volunteer" a child into the institution. Id. § 6000(b). This
procedure has been criticized. See Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment
of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REv. 840 (1974).
164. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5350(a) (West 1972) (providing that con-
servators may be appointed for "gravely disabled" minors).
165. Id. The term "gravely disabled" is defined as describing "a condition in which
a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal
needs for food, clothing, or shelter." Id. § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1975). Obviously,
this definition is not particularly illuminative in the case of young children, who cannot
be expected to provide their own food, clothing, and shelter, even if they enjoy good
mental health. This problem was recognized by the California Supreme Court in In re
Michael E.: "Although a minor may not be legally -responsible to provide for his basic
personal needs, or may suffer disabilities other than a mental disorder which preclude
him from so providing, the definition is nevertheless applicable. A minor is 'gravely
disabled' within the meaning of section 5008, subdivision (h) (1), when the trier of fact,
on expert and other testimony, finds that disregarding other disabilities, if any, the
minor, because of the further disability of a mental disorder, would be unable to provide
for his basic personal needs. Immaturity, either physical or mental when not brought
about by a mental disorder, is not a disability which would render a minor 'gravely dis-
abled' within the meaning of section 5008." In re Michael E., 15 Cal. 3d 183, 192 n.12,
123 Cal. Rptr. 103, 108-09.
166. In re L.L., 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 209, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14 (1974).
167. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 741 (West 1972).
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that this authority did not include the power to place the juvenile
directly in a state mental institution. 1
68
In re L.L. was upheld by the California Supreme Court in In re
Michael E.169  The juvenile court had committed Michael to the cus-
tody of a probation officer "'for ultimate placement in a private or
public facility, including. . .Camarillo State Hospital. . . . " The
probation officer accordingly proceeded to file a "voluntary" petition for
Michael's commitment pursuant to section 6000 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.1 71  Michael claimed that the juvenile court order
violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial, to due process, and to
equal protection of the laws. His arguments were based on the grounds
that a conservatorship proceeding had not been invoked and that his
commitment was in fact involuntary.172  The court held that "the
[involuntary] commitment of a mentally disordered minor who is a
ward of the juvenile court can be accomplished only in accordance with
the LPS Act.' 73  The court noted that a conservator may be recom-
mended only when no suitable alternative is available, 174 that the con-
servator may commit the minor ward only when specifically authorized
to do so by the court, 75 that conservatorship automatically ends after
one year,176 and that the conservatee may petition 77 for a rehearing
every six monthsY.78  The court, pursuant 'to section 5350 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code, 79 expressly ruled that such proceedings
would result in commitment only of "gravely disabled" juveniles to the
state mental hospitals. 8 '
The practical effect of these two decisions is that juvenile courts
may no longer directly place their mentally ill wards in the state mental
hospitals. Conservatorship proceedings, with all their attendant safe-
guards, must be initiated, and the minor will be entitled to a jury trial on
the issue of whether he is "gravely disabled."' 8 ' As a result, juveniles
who are suffering from some form of mental illness but who are not
168. In re L.L., 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 215, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 19 (1974).
169. 15 Cal. 3d 183, 538 P.2d 231, 123 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1975).
170. Id. at 187, 538 P.2d at 233, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
171. See note 163 supra.
172. In re Michael E., 15 Cal. 3d at 187-88, 538 P.2d at 233, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
105.
173. Id. at 189, 538 P.2dat235, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
174. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5352-54 (West Supp. 1975).
175. Id. § 5358.
176. Id. H§ 5361-62 (West 1972).
177. Id. § 5364.
178. 15 Cal. 3d at 192, 538 P.2d at 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
179. See note 164 supra.
180. In re Michael E., 15 Cal. 3d at 192, 538 P.2d at 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
181. See id.
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within the definition of "gravely disabled" can only be treated outside
the state hospital system. 182
Because of these two decisions, California juveniles are now afford-
ed all of the due process rights granted to adults prior to involuntary
commitment. These decisions also mean, however, that mentally ill
juveniles who were formerly treated in state mental hospitals, at state
expense, 8 ' will now be a further burden on already inadequate commu-
nity facilities.18 4
Some Attempted Solutions
Following the decision in Michael E., a committee was formed in
San Francisco to work toward a solution to the problem of placing
mentally ill juveniles at the community level. 85 A new facility for
disturbed and delinquent adolescents, the Adolescent Residential Treat-
ment Service (ARTS), has recently been established in San Francis-
co. '8 This much-needed resource will serve adolescents between the
ages of twelve and seventeen for stays of six months to one year. In
addition to a fifteen-bed residential program, ARTS will offer a day
treatment program for an additional fifteen patients. The staff also
plans to provide a special education program as well as family thera-
py.18 7
In the Los Angeles area, as a result of the efforts of Supervisor
Hayes,188 a special unit, "Five B," was established at Camarillo State
Hospital on January 2, 1975, for the aggressive, "acting out" young
patient. Juveniles are referred to Five B from the juvenile court follow-
ing a screening process which determines that they are "hard-to-handle"
youths who cannot be helped elsewhere. Eighteen youngsters are cur-
rently being treated in this program. Procedures for commitment of
children to this unit must now be changed in light of the L.L. and
182. The result of the holdings in It re L.L. and In re Michael E. can, however,
be circumvented if the juvenile court dismisses jurisdiction over the child, and the mi-
nor's parent or guardian then "volunteers" the child into the state mental hospital pur-
suant to § 6000(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. See note 163 supra.
183. Section 7275 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires relatives to bear
the cost of hospitalization of a family member in a state hospital; however, section 7276
provides that the Director of Health may "reduce, cancel, or remit" the amount to be
paid by relatives if they are unable to pay. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §
7275 (West 1972) with id. § 7276 (West Supp. 1975).
184. Interview with Robert L. Walker, counsel for L.L. and Michael E., Youth Law
Center, in San Francisco, Nov. 14, 1975.
185. Id.
186. INSIDE WESTSIDE, NEWSLETTER OF THE WESTSIDE COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH CENTER AND COMMUNITY ADvISORY BOARD, Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 7.
187. Id.
188. See notes 99-100 & accompanying text supra.
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Michael E. decisions; 189 a hospital administrator reports -that conserva-
torship proceedings have been completed for some of the patients in the




More innovative programs like Camarillo State Hospital's Five B or
San Francisco's ARTS are urgently needed throughout the state.,
Proper care and treatment of California's mentally ill juvenile court
wards cannot, however, be accomplished at the community level without
help and guidance from the state.
The state could relieve part of the increased burden on the counties
by remitting to the applicable local treasury the state funds which would
have been used to treat patients who are rejected by the hospital or who
can no longer be treated there. For example, when a state hospital
refused to accept a patient because she was "too hard to handle," the
state would pay the county the amount the state would have spent had
the hospital accepted the patient into one of its treatment programs.
Similarly, children who were formerly placed by the juvenile court in
state mental hospitals, but who now must be treated at the community
level unless a jury determines that they are "gravely disabled" would
have their community treatment subsidized by the state. Current esti-
mates are ,that the cost per patient per day is approximately $75 to $85
at the Children's Unit at Napa State Hospital and $45 to $50 at the
Napa Adolescent Unit.12  If these amounts were remitted -to the coun-
ties, expanded services at the local level would be possible. This type of
solution was recently applied by a Pennsylvania court. In In re Joyce
Z.,193 the state institution for the retarded admitted that it could not
adequately treat Joyce; the alternative was local treatment at greater
189. See notes 160-85 & accompanying text supra.
190. Telephone interview with Dr. I. H. Perkins, Consultant, Office of Program Re-
view, Camarillo State Hospital, Nov. 19, 1975.
191. One observer, with a distinguished career as police officer, probation officer,
and mental health care consultant, presently in private practice as a psychiatric social
worker in Oakland, stated that the lack of treatment facilities for the dangerous or "act-
ing out" mentally ill juvenile is almost universal. In his experience, such minors are
frequently subjected to lengthy stays at juvenile halls, while their probation officers
try desperately to find a place that will treat and care for such problem children. Inter-
view with Arthur E. Elliott, Summit Psychiatric Center, in Oakland, Cal., Nov. 18, 1975.
192. Telephone interview with Betty Webster, Coordinator, Community Relations,
Children's Center, Napa State Hospital, Nov. 19, 1975. The vast difference in cost be-
tween the Children's Unit and the Adolescent Unit at Napa is attributable to the fact
that the Children's Unit has a much higher staff-patient ratio than does the Adolescent
Unit.
193. See note 149 & accompanying text supra.
than usual county expense. The court ordered the state to pay for the
community-based treatment, while the county was to provide the cost of
casework."' Such a revenue sharing plan should, in appropriate cases,
be used in California.
Another way in which to provide better treatment services to
juvenile court wards would be to coordinate children's programs more
efficiently at the local level. One child may, for example, be eligible for
ohild welfare, Medi-Cal, and special education funds. If all social
welfare services available to children were coordinated, funds could be
pooled, thus insuring maximum effectiveness for each scarce tax dol-
lar.'95 The present situation in many counties, according to one social
worker, is that families with troubled children are frequently shunted
from agency to agency; one county office may not know enough about
other county programs to refer the client to the right source of help.'96
This Kafkaesque situation is economically unsound and serves only to
create anger and frustration in families seeking assistance. If parents of
mentally ill children were aware of available community services, they
might be able to avoid releasing their children to the wardship of the
juvenile court. At present, the juvenile court in many counties becomes
the last resort for distraught parents who are unable to thread their way
through the maze of social service agencies.' 97
Probation departments could utilize existing private facilities to a
greater extent than they do currently. One observer feels that the
private sector can compete economically with public institutions in this
area while offering similar, if not better, care and treatment. 198
Higher priorities should be given to children's programs at the local
level funded under the Short-Doyle Act,'99 which provides for state
funding of certain city and county mental health programs. In the past,
when scarce resources have been allocated, children's services have often
received inadequate funds,200 in spite of an announced legislative intent
to give special consideration to children's programs.20 '
194. Id.
195. Interview with Robert L. Walker, Youth Law Center, in San Francisco, Cal.,
Nov. 14, 1975.
196. Interview with Arthur E. Elliott, Summit Psychiatric Center, in Oakland, Cal.,
Nov. 18, 1975.
197. Id.
198. Id. The same solution was proposed by the Bolton report. See, PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 170.
199. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5600-5767 (West 1972 & Supp. 1975). The
state provides 90% of the funds for Short-Doyle programs, while the county con-
tributes 10% of the money. Id. § 5705 (West 1972).
200. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
201. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5704.5 (West 1972).
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Providing better care and treatment for the menally ill juvenile
court ward does not require the costly erection of new buildings. Su-
pervisor Hayes of Los Angeles has suggested that space in existing
buildings be converted to treatment centers for "hard to handle" mental-
ly ill juveniles. 20 2  This practical suggestion could be effected with
relative ease and economy. One observer believes that taxpayers and
private foundations are willing to pay for "tangibles," such as red brick
hospital buildings, but not for "intangibles," such as the services of
psychiatrists, nurses, social workers, and other personnel.20 3 Since
treatment and rehabilitation of mentally ill juveniles cannot be accom-
plished without adequate staff,20 4 this public attitude must be changed.
The alternative to extensive efforts to establish and maintain effec-
tive treatment programs for the children whose mental problems are
most severe is that these juveniles may be "warehoused" in juvenile
halls, receiving no treatment at all. Some of these children, if ignored,
might grow out of their behavioral problems through the normal matur-
ation process; others may be so ill that medical science lacks a cure for
their disorders. In any event, the state, once it takes custody of such
children, has a legal duty to provide "such care and guidance. . . as
will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the State."2  Surely the state's best
interests are not served by allowing human potential to be wasted and
children to suffer merely because adequate treatment facilities are not
available for mentally ill juveniles.
Although he was not known for enthusiastic support of public
expenditures for social welfare programs, Herbert Hoover was fond of
saying that "children are our most valuable natural resource." 20 6 To
realize this ideal, creative steps must be taken to provide the care and
treatment to which mentally ill juvenile court wards are constitutionally
and statutorily entitled.
Jane Elizabeth Lovell*
202. See Motion of Supervisor James A. Hayes at 2-3, Exhibit A, in Petition for
Writ of Mandate, Doe v. Hufford, Civil No. 113831 (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Jan.
29, 1975).
203. Interview with Arthur E. Elliott, Summit Psychiatric Center, in Oakland, Cal.,
Nov. 18, 1975.
204. See the court's recommendations concerning the minimum professional staff
necessary for adequate treatment in Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex.
1974). See note 88 & accompanying text supra.
205. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
206. N.Y. Times (Obituary), Oct. 21, 1964, at 42, col. 6.
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